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THE "MOTHER COURT" AND THE FOREIGN PLAINTIFF:
DOES RULE 10b-5 REACH FAR ENOUGH?
JAMES J. FINNER TY III
INTRODUCTION
The international character of national securities markets increased
dramatically in the 1980s.1 The removal of restrictions on foreign partic-
ipation in many domestic securities markets' has led firms to cross their
1. The terms "internationalization" and "globalization" reflect trends evident in the
world's capital markets and the international financial system. See Richard A. Debs, The
Development of International Equity Markets, 4 B.U. Int'l L.J. 5, 5 (1986). The lack of
international clearance and settlement links to facilitate cross-border settlements, how-
ever, is a significant obstacle to a truly integrated international securities market. See
Internationalization of the Securities Markets: Report of the Staff of the United States
Securities and Exchange Comm'n to the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs and the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce 11-18 (1987) [hereinafter Inter-
nationalization of the Securities Markets]. The global securities market thus more accu-
rately resembles "a quilt in which clearly distinct markets are stitched together through
various linkages" rather than one single integrated securities market. Peter Behr, Trade
Link Promises Regulatory Headaches, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1986, at Dl (quoting Gary
Lynch, former Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission).
For comprehensive analyses of the underlying economic, technological, and regulatory
forces shaping the process of market integration, see Internationalization of the Securities
Markets, supra, and Terry M. Chuppe et al., The Securities Markets in the 1980s: A
Global Perspective (1989).
2. In the 1980s, many of the world's major financial centers amended their la%s to
remove or lessen barriers to foreign investment in their domestic financial markets. In
1986, for example, Britain enacted the Financial Services Act of 1986, which created a
self-regulatory scheme within a statutory framework. See generally Harold S. Bloomen-
thal, United Kingdom: Financial Services Act of 1986, in 6A International Capital Mar-
kets and Securities Regulation (Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff eds., 1992)
(discussing Financial Services Act of 1986); Sam S. Miller, Regulating Financial Services
in the United Kingdom: An American Perspective, 44 Bus. Law. 323 (1989) (examining
investor protection regulations under the Financial Services Act of 1986); Aulana L. Pe-
ters & Andrew E. Feldman, The Changing Structure of the Securities Markets and the
Securities Industry: Implications for International Securities Regulation, 9 Mich. Y.B.
Int'l Legal Stud. 19 (1988) (discussing implications of the London Exchange's reforms);
Barry A.K. Rider, Policing the International Financial Markets: An English Perspective,
16 Brook. J. Int'l L. 179 (1990) (discussing British Financial Services Act of 1986 and
history of British regulation of securities fraud); Patrick M. Creaven, Note, Inside
Outside Leave Me Alone: Domestic and EC-Motivated Reform in the UK Securities Indus-
try, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S285 (1992) (discussing securities industry reform in the United
Kingdom).
France also substantially increased access to its capital markets for foreign firms. See
generally James Lightburn, Insider Trading in France, Int'l Fin. L. Rev., Jan. 1988, at 23
(discussing regulatory enforcement problems in France); Leslie A. Goldman, Note, The
Modernization of the French Securities Markets: Making the EEC Connection, 60 Ford-
ham L. Rev. S227 (1992) (discussing reforms in the French securities markets). Simi-
larly, the Tokyo Stock Exchange has increased the number of seats allocated to foreign
firms. See Internationalization of the Securities Markets, supra note 1, at V-21.
The removal or easing of barriers to foreign investment, such as exchange controls and
foreign investment restrictions, and the growth of investor-protection measures have been
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national borders to raise capital in foreign markets. Moreover, advances
in telecommunications and data processing systems enable both Ameri-
can and foreign investors to purchase and sell securities virtually instan-
taneously in different national exchanges. This increasing integration of
the world's securities markets has expanded legitimate investment and
capital-raising opportunities. Correspondingly, these global investment
opportunities have presented new opportunities for novel transnational
securities fraud schemes.4 It also poses difficult questions about the ap-
propriate reach of the United States' securities laws.5
coined "access deregulation/prudential re-regulation." For a discussion of this process,
see Manning G. Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements
of the European Communities, 31 Harv. Int'l L.J. 185, 187-193 (1990).
3. See Chuppe et al., supra note 1, at 18; Behr, supra note 1, at D1 (describing an
electronic "superhighway ... connect[ing] stock markets and banking centers around the
world").
4. See James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an
Internationalized Marketplace, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S77, 581 (1992); see also 134 Cong.
Rec. 15,369-70 (1988) (statement of Sen. Riegle) (observing that "securities fraud is no
longer confined within any single nation's borders"); James B. Stewart, Den of Thieves
(1991) (describing use of international channels to evade detection of insider trading ac-
tivities); Behr, supra note 1, at Dl (noting that international securities linkages "will
expand the range of the highwaymen who try to manipulate securities markets or prey
upon unwary or inexperienced investors"); The SEC's New World Role, Economist, Jan.
6, 1990, at 73 (stating that investors lost at least $5 billion in fraudulent securities trans-
actions worldwide and that American investors lost $1.6 billion to both American and
foreign defrauders in 1988).
5. The application of the Exchange Act to transnational securities activities has been
discussed frequently. See, e.g., John M. Fedders, Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital
Markets: Methods to Obtain Evidence Abroad, 18 Int'l Law. 89 (1984); Jill E. Fisch, Im-
prudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers, 87 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 523 (1992); Bernhard Grossfeld & C. Paul Rogers, A Shared Values Approach to
Jurisdictional Conflicts in International Economic Law, 32 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 931
(1983); Robert C. Hacker & Ronald D. Rotunda, The Extraterritorial Regulation of For-
eign Business under the U.S. Securities Laws, 59 N.C. L. Rev. 643 (1981); Louis Loss,
Extraterritoriality in the Federal Securities Code, 20 Harv. Int'l L.J. 305 (1979); Margaret
V. Sachs, The International Reach of Rule 10b-5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 677 (1990); Stevan Sandberg, The Extraterritorial Reach of
American Economic Regulation: The Case of Securities Law, 17 Harv. Int'l L.J. 315
(1976); Barbara S. Thomas, Extraterritoriality in an Era of Internationalization of the
Securities Markets: The Need to Revisit Domestic Policies, 35 Rutgers L. Rev. 453 (1983);
David E. Van Zandt, The Regulatory and Institutional Conditions for an International
Securities Market, 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 47 (1991); Note, American Adjudication of Transna-
tional Securities Fraud, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 553 (1976); Harold A. Malkin, Comment, Ex-
traterritorial Application of United States Commodity and Securities Laws to Market
Transactions in an Age of Intercontinental Trading Links, 7 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 351
(1985); Gregory K. Matson, Note, Restricting the Jurisdiction of American Courts over
Transnational Securities Fraud, 79 Geo. L.J. 141 (1990); Note, Predictability and Comity:
Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1310 (1985)
[hereinafter Predictability and Comity]; Bruce Alan Rosenfield, Note, Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 1005
(1976); Edward A. Taylor, Note, Expanding the Jurisdictional Basis for Transnational
Securities Fraud Cases: A Minimal Conduct Approach, 6 Fordham Int'l L.J. 308 (1983);
Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule 1Ob-5, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363 (1973);
Judson J. Wambold, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Antifraud Provisions of
The Securities Acts, 11 Cornell Int'l L.J. 137 (1978); Neal T. Buethe & Thomas J. Coyne,
TRANSNA TIONAL APPLICATION
The Securities Act of 19336 (the "1933 Act") and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19347 (the "Exchange Act") are the foundations of the
United States' securities laws. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act' and
Rule lOb-5,9 issued under section 10(b), are the centerpieces of the inves-
tor-protection provisions of the United States' securities regulations. In
the last two decades, the federal courts increasingly have applied the Ex-
change Act to transnational securities fraud10 cases."
The Second Circuit has been the pioneer" in establishing the parame-
ters of the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction 3 over transnational
securities fraud. Lacking congressional guidance 4 concerning the Ex-
change Act's applicability to such transactions, the Second Circuit has
developed two alternative jurisdictional tests in transnational securities
fraud cases. The first, known as the "conduct" test, examines the nature
of the defendant's conduct in the United States and its relation to the
alleged fraudulent securities transaction.' 5 The second, known as the
Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Securities Fraud Cases: The Expanding Ap-
plication of the Conduct Test, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 471 (1984).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). Section 10(b) authorizes the SEC to issue rules making
it
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
Id.
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992). Rule 10b-5 prohibits any person participating in a
securities transaction from "employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud...
[or] engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud." Id.
10. For the purposes of this Note, "transnational securities fraud" and "cross-border
securities fraud" refer to material misrepresentations or omissions in the purchase or sale
of securities involving United States issuers or traders, or their affiliates, and foreign in-
vestors abroad.
11. Section 27 of the Exchange Act confers upon federal courts the exclusive jurisdic-
tion to enforce the United States' securities laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
12. In the field of securities law in general, the Second Circuit has been deemed the
"Mother Court." See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
13. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's authority or competence to adjudi-
cate the subject matter of the lawsuit. See Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure § 1350, at 194 (2d ed. 1990).
14. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
15. For cases construing the "conduct" test, see IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1980); Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honey-
well Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir.
1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972); see also infra notes 33-85 and accompanying text.
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"effects" test, measures the specific direct effects of an alleged fraudulent
transaction on American investors or the United States' securities mar-
kets.1 6 If a cross-border securities transaction satisfies either the "ef-
fects" test or the "conduct" test, a court will exercise jurisdiction over a
transnational securities fraud claim.
In applying the "conduct test," the Second Circuit requires that the
actual fraudulent act forming the basis of the foreign plaintiff's Rule lOb-
5 claim occur in the United States and directly result in the foreign plain-
tiff's loss. The Second Circuit's analysis, though not the same threshold
of material conduct, has been widely adopted by other circuits. 17
The Second Circuit's direct causation requirement, however, fails to
recognize fully that the world's financial markets are increasingly inte-
grated and that securities fraud transcends national borders. The likeli-
hood of a misrepresentation or omission directly causing a foreign
plaintiff's loss occurring in the United States easily can be reduced
through the use of offshore corporate entities or other international chan-
nels. Consequently, the failure to permit a foreign plaintiff's private ac-
tion under the Exchange Act where the defendant's acts in the United
States are "merely preparatory" and, therefore, not the direct cause of
the foreign plaintiff's loss may impugn the perceived fairness and integ-
rity of the United States' securities markets.
The current conduct analysis for determining whether United States
courts have jurisdiction over a cross-border securities transactions leave a
gap through which innovative perpetrators of fraud may circumvent
United States' securities regulations. Thus, the courts must modify their
analysis. Rather than framing the jurisdictional analysis solely in terms
of the sufficiency of the defendant's conduct in the United States, the
courts should consider whether a defendant purposely has used a per-
ceived affiliation with the United States to induce a foreign investor to
participate in an allegedly fraudulent securities transaction.
This Note addresses the application of Rule lOb-5 in transnational se-
curities fraud cases. In Part I, this Note surveys the Second Circuit's and
its sister circuits' analyses of the extraterritorial scope of the Exchange
Act's antifraud provisions. Part I also examines the policy concerns un-
derlying these decisions. Part II proposes a limited extension of the Ex-
change Act's antifraud provisions in transnational securities fraud cases.
It suggests that a federal court assert subject matter jurisdiction over a
cross-border securities transaction when an actor purposely uses the per-
ceived integrity of the American securities markets to induce a foreign
16. For cases construing the "effects" test, see Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Mi-
norco S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), modified by 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
492 U.S. 939 (1989); Bersch, 519 F.2d at 974; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200
(2d Cir.), rev'd, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969);
see also infra notes 33-85 and accompanying text.
17. The Third, Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts have adopted
the Second Circuit's analytical framework.
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investor to enter into a fraudulent securities transaction. Part HI consid-
ers whether such an extension of Rule lOb-5 to predominately foreign
securities transactions is proper given the likelihood of jurisdictional con-
flicts between different countries. This Section briefly discusses interest-
based approaches to resolving jurisdictional conflicts and concludes that
such approaches are inappropriate. Instead, this Section advocates an
approach based on the traditional judicial doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. Finally, this Note concludes that the prevailing conduct test for
determining the transnational reach of Rule lOb-5 is inadequate. Rather,
a "purposeful use" test should supplement the current conduct standard.
This approach is better suited to the character of today's securities mar-
kets because it recognizes the increasing importance of the foreign inves-
tor to the stability of the United States' financial markets as well as to the
overseas capital-raising activities of United States firms. This Note fur-
ther concludes that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a more ap-
propriate tool for determining whether an assertion of the United States'
jurisdiction is appropriate. Forum non conveniens establishes a judicially
manageable approach to resolving potential jurisdictional conflicts.
I. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE REACH OF RULE lOb-5 IN
TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD CASES
A. International Law and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Absent express congressional direction, the principles of international
law operate as a limitation on the transnational application of the Ex-
change Act."8 Customary international law recognizes that a state has
subject matter jurisdiction in civil matters over an object within its terri-
tory, 9 over the conduct of any person within its borders," and over the
conduct of a person outside its borders that causes substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effects within its borders." Under international law, a
state also has jurisdiction over the conduct of its nationals, wherever it
22may occur. Assuming a "genuine connection" 23 between the national
and the state, an individual has the nationality of the state that confers
18. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
("[A]n act of [Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains ...."). While a detailed examination of the princi-
ples of international law is beyond the scope of this Note, a review of the basic principles
governing a state's assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in civil cases is necessary. For
general discussions of international law, see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public Interna-
tional Law (4th ed. 1990); Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1968); Louis
Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1555 (1984).
19. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 402(1)(b) (1987) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)].
20. See idL § 402(l)(b) & cmt. c.
21. See id § 402(1)(b) & cmt. d.
22. See id § 402(2) & cmt. e.
23. See The Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), [1955]
I.C.J. 4, reprinted in Myres S. McDouglas & W. Michael Reisman, International Law in
Contemporary Perspective 816 (1981) ("[Nlationality is a legal bond having as its basis a
19931 S291
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citizenship upon him2 4 and a private legal entity has the nationality of
the state in which it is created.25 The United States, however, typically
does not apply this nationality principle to establish jurisdiction over its
citizens in civil or criminal matters. 26 Further, the Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States suggests that a state
may not extend its jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to the conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on
the ground that the conduct affects one of its nationals.27
These principles have guided the federal courts' construction of the
transnational reach of the Exchange Act. Neither the express language
of the Exchange Act's antifraud provisions nor its legislative history re-
veal whether the Seventy-third Congress, which enacted the law, in-
tended the transnational application of securities regulations issued
under section 10(b).28 Indeed, section 10(b)'s legislative history simply
indicates that its drafters envisioned it as a "catch-all '29 prohibition
social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments,
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.").
24. See Restatement (Third), supra note 19, § 211.
25. See id. § 213.
26. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International En-
forcement of Criminal Law, 31 Harv. Int'l L.J. 37, 41 (1990). But see Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (antitrust), af'd, 749 F.2d
1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344
U.S. 280 (1952) (trademark infringement); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421
(1932) (tax).
27. See Restatement (Third), supra note 19, § 402 cmt. g.
28. Section 10(b)'s enactment provoked little discussion regarding its purpose and
application. See Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House accompanying
Conference Report on Securities Exchange Act of 1934, H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 32-33 (1934) (noting that House bill and Senate amendment contain similar pro-
visions and that the substitute bill agreed to in the House-Senate Conference contained
the Senate language), reprinted in 5 J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, Legislative His-
tory of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1973) [hereinafter
5 Legislative History].
For thorough discussions of Congress' consideration of the Exchange Act, see Steve
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 Stan. L.
Rev. 385 (1990) and Margaret V. Sachs, The International Reach of Rule 10b-5: The
Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 677 (1990).
The Exchange Act's enactment largely was a reaction to widespread financial specula-
tion and sudden, unpredictable fluctuations in stock market prices in the early twentieth
century. See Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 1-2 (1982)(noting that
during the 1920s approximately $50 billion in new securities were sold in the United
States, $25 billion of which became valueless). Following the 1929 market collapse, Con-
gress began an investigation into stock exchange financial practices and their effect on
domestic securities markets. See Stock Exchange Practices, Letter from the Counsel for
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency under S. Res. 84, 72nd Cong. to the Senate
Banking and Currency Comm., Feb. 18, 1933, at 32 (identifying manipulation of market
value through pool arrangements, corporate officers' use of inside information in the sale
and purchase of stocks, and the dissemination of fraudulent information through friendly
financial journalists as contributing to market instability, excessive speculation, and finan-
cial ruin of thousands of retail investors), reprinted in 5 Legislative History, supra.
29. See Hearings on Securities Exchange Regulation Before the House Comm. on In.
terstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas G.
S292 [Vol. 61
TRANSNA TIONAL APPLICATION
against manipulative and fraudulent practices. Similarly, Rule l0b-5's
administrative history is unenlightening. 30
Absent clear congressional direction, the courts have sought to iden-
tify a legislative intent to support the transnational application of Rule
lOb-5. 3' Drawing from the Exchange Act's language and its intended
purpose of protecting American investors and the United States' securi-
ties markets, the courts admittedly have made policy judgments concern-
Corcoran, one of the Exchange Act's drafters, discussing an early version of the bill),
reprinted in 8 J.S. Ellenberger and Ellen P. Mahar, Legislative History of the Securities
Act of 1933 & Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1973).
30. Rule lOb-5 was issued in 1948 to provide the SEC a regulatory basis to prevent
fraud in the purchase of securities. For a description of the events surrounding Rule 10b-
5's adoption, see Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. Law. 891, 922-
23 (1967) (explaining that Rule lOb-5 was adopted unanimously without discussion ex-
cept for "Well, we are against fraud, aren't we?"). Professor Louis Loss identifies Free-
man as the "father" of Rule lOb-5. See id at 918. To date, the SEC has not attempted to
define the extraterritorial reach of Rule lOb-5 under its rule-making authority.
31. See e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.) ("We are reluctant to con-
clude that Congress intended to allow the United States to become a 'Barbary Coast,' as
it were, harboring international securities 'pirates.' "), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977);
IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975) (reasoning that Congress did not
intend for the United States "to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security
devices for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners"); Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) (reasoning that
Congress did not intend for the Exchange Act to apply to an American corporation con-
ducting securities transactions outside the United States "[w]hen no fraud has been prac-
ticed in this country and the purchase or sale has not been made here"); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.) (concluding that Congress intended § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 to protect "domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on
American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities markets from the effects of
improper foreign transactions in American securities"), modified on other grounds, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
In determining congressional intent concerning the transnational application of the
Exchange Act, the courts have reasoned that the Exchange Act's silence resulted from
the Seventy-third Congress' failure to envision the growth of an international securities
market. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The
web of international connections in the securities market was then not nearly as extensive
or complex as it has become."); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d
Cir.) ("The Congress that passed these extraordinary pieces of legislation in the midst of
the depression could hardly have been expected to foresee the development of offshore
funds thirty years later."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
For a persuasive argument to the contrary, see Sachs, supra note 5. Professor Sachs
argues that Congress was aware that the United States securities markets were highly
international when considering the Exchange Act, but nevertheless chose to protect only
those investors whose trades occurred on national securities markets. Thus, Sachs con-
cludes that the courts should limit standing under Rule lOb-5 to domestic securities in-
vestors. Arguably, the courts' statements are exaggerated. See Stock Exchange
Practices, Senate Report No. 1455, 73d Cong., Report of the Senate Banking and Cur-
rency Comm. Pursuant to S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, June 16, 1934, at 83-
154 (examining investment bank manipulation of foreign government bond prices to facil-
itate their distribution and the financial hardship resulting from widespread foreign gov-
ernment defaults), reprinted in 5 Legislative History, supra note 28. To accept Professor
Sachs' conclusion in the existing internationalized securities marketplace, however,
would place most cross-border transactions beyond the reach of our legal system and thus
undermine the legal regime of United States securities market regulation.
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ing the provision's reach.32 This Section will trace the application of
Rule lOb-5 in actions arising from transnational securities fraud. It also
will examine the policy concerns underlying these decisions. This analy-
sis will focus first on the Second Circuit and then its sister circuits.
B. The "Mother Court" and Application of Rule 10b-5 to
Transnational Securities Activities
The Second Circuit was the first circuit court to consider whether a
federal court should assert subject matter jurisdiction over a transna-
tional securities fraud claim.33 Its analytical framework has been
adopted by other circuits.
The Second Circuit first considered whether Congress intended to ap-
ply the Exchange Act's antifraud provisions to a fraudulent sale of stock
involving two foreign corporations in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.34
There, an American shareholder in Banff Oil, Ltd., a Canadian corpora-
tion traded on the American Stock Exchange, brought a derivative suit
alleging damages from the fraudulent sale of Banff treasury stock to two
foreign defendants, Aquitane of Canada, Ltd. and Paribas Corporation.35
In exercising jurisdiction, the Second Circuit held that subject matter
jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud existed if the securities
were traded on an American exchange and the transaction could have
adversely affected American investors.36 The court thus established that
a general economic effect on a United States' securities market was suffli-
32. Compare Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993:
We freely acknowledge that if we were asked to point to language in the
statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we
would be unable to respond.... Our conclusions rest on case law and commen-
tary concerning the application of the securities laws ... and on our best judg-
ment as to what Congress would have wished if these problems had occurred to
it.
(footnote omitted) and Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116 ("[W]e may encourage other nations to
take appropriate steps against parties who seek to perpetrate frauds in the United
States.") with Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 33:
Kasser's policy arguments may provide very good reasons why Congress
should amend the statute but are less adequate as reasons why courts should do
so. As the Supreme Court has said in another context,'[t]he responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between
competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones .... (citing Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984)).
33. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), modified on other grounds,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
34. See id.
35. The plaintiff alleged that Banff's directors and the defendants' officers conspired
to defraud Banff by selling treasury shares at a market price that the defendants knew did
not reflect the actual value of the shares. See id. at 205-06.
36. See id. at 208. Construing the "effects" test broadly, the Schoenbaum court found
that the fraudulent sale of Banff's stock at a price below its actual value would reduce
Banff's shareholders' equity. The court hypothesized that, in turn, this decreased Banff's
common stock share prices on the American Stock Exchange. See id. at 208-09.
S294 [Vol. 61
TRANSNA TIONAL APPLICATION
cient to permit an American court to assert jurisdiction over a cross-
border securities transaction. In reaching this holding, the Schoenbaum
court concluded that Congress intended section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to
protect "domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on
American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from
the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities."37
The Second Circuit next considered whether a United States court
could exercise jurisdiction under the Exchange Act over a transaction in
foreign securities traded exclusively on a foreign securities market. In
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,38 the late Robert Max-
well allegedly misrepresented the financial performance of Pergamon
Press, a British corporation he controlled, to induce Leasco, an Ameri-
can corporation, to purchase Pergamon's stock at a price exceeding its
actual value. Maxwell negotiated the Pergamon stock purchase with
Leasco in both the United States and Great Britain and made substantial
misrepresentations in both countries regarding Pergamon's profitability,
existing printing technology, and sales performance. The actual Per-
gamon stock purchase, however, occurred on the London Stock
Exchange.39
The court first examined whether the adverse economic effect on
Leasco's stock price was sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the "ef-
fects" test. It declined, however, to assert jurisdiction over the American
plaintiff's claims under the "effects" test, even though the plaintiff suf-
fered a measurable adverse financial effect.' The court reasoned that
Congress did not intend for the Exchange Act to apply to an American
corporation conducting securities transactions outside the United States
"[w]hen no fraud has been practiced in this country and the purchase or
sale has not been made here."41 Rather, the court analyzed Maxwell's
conduct in the United States. Reviewing Maxwell's activities in the
United States, the court concluded that his "substantial misrepresenta-
tions" in the United States were sufficient to confer jurisdiction.4" In
reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that Congress would have
37. Id at 206. The court, however, dismissed the Rule lOb-5 claim. It held that the
American shareholder's pleadings failed to state a cause of action under Rule lOb-5 since
the plaintiff's allegations against Banff's directors amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty,
not fraud. See id. at 210-11.
38. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
39. See id. at 1332. Responding to a Maxwell-instigated rumor of an imminent take-
over of Pergamon, which would have increased its share price, Leasco purchased approx-
imately $22 million worth of Pergamon stock on the London Stock Exchange before
discovering Maxwell's false claims. See id. at 1332-33.
40. See id. at 1334. The court declined to extend Schoenbaum to include the adverse
financial effect "of the fraudulently induced purchases in England of securities of an Eng-
lish corporation, not traded in an organized American securities market, upon an Ameri-
can corporation whose stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and its
shareholders." Id
41. Id
42. See id. at 1337.
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"wished to protect an American investor if a foreigner comes to the
United States and fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securities
abroad.) 4 3
In Leasco, the Second Circuit thus first announced that a foreign de-
fendant's conduct in the United States was sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion over a cross-border securities transaction. Even though the actual
stock purchase occurred abroad and involved the securities of a foreign
corporation not traded on an American exchange, the court dismissed
Maxwell's contention that the "critical misrepresentations" occurred in
London.' According to the court, Maxwell's meetings with Leasco ex-
ecutives and his telephone calls and letters to Leasco "whetted Leasco's
interest in acquiring Pergamon"45 and, therefore, constituted an " 'essen-
tial link'" in inducing Leasco to purchase Pergamon stock on the
London Exchange.46 Thus, the Leasco court stated the broad proposition
that the Exchange Act would apply to securities transactions conducted
abroad where a foreign defendant has engaged in some conduct in the
United States related to the fraudulent securities transaction.
In 1975, the Second Circuit revisited this issue--deciding two cases in
which foreign plaintiffs sought to sue American defendants involved in
allegedly fraudulent cross-border securities transactions.
In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,7 the Second Circuit redefined the
applicability of the Exchange Act's antifraud provisions to cross-border
securities transactions. In Bersch, an American citizen brought a class
action on behalf of individuals who had purchased common stock in In-
vestors Overseas Services, Ltd. ("IOS"), a Canadian corporation.48 The
plaintiffs alleged that IOS issued a misleading prospectus during its pub-
lic offering of an offshore mutual fund and that the American defendants
assisted IOS with the planning of the public offering and with the draft-
ing of the prospectus within the United States.49
The Bersch court considered the plaintiffs' argument that the collapse
of IOS caused an adverse economic effect on U.S. securities markets and
on American investors sufficient to permit subject matter jurisdiction
over the foreign class members' claims.5 0 Narrowing Schoenbaum, the
43. Id.
44. See id. at 1334-35.
45. Id. at 1335.
46. See id. (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970)). The
court also demonstrated a concern about the parties' nationalities. See id. at 1338 ("The
case is quite different from another hypothetical we posed at argument, namely, where a
German and a Japanese businessman met in New York for convenience, and the latter
fraudulently induced the former to make purchases of Japanese securities on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange.").
47. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
48. See id. at 977-78. The plaintiff class included U.S citizens residing in the United
States, U.S. citizens residing abroad, and foreign citizens who had purchased the OS
stock outside the United States. See id. at 993-98.
49. See id. at 981.
50. See id. at 987-90.
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court held that the "effects" test conferred jurisdiction over fraudulent
cross-border securities transactions "only when [the transaction] result[s]
in injury to purchasers or sellers of those securities in whom the United
States has an interest, not where acts simply have an adverse affect on the
American economy or American investors generally."52 Consequently,
the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign class members'
claims under the "effects" test.5 3
The court next considered whether the defendants' conduct in the
United States was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. After reviewing the
district court's factual findings,54 the court concluded that the defend-
ants' activities in the United States were "merely preparatory" to the
actual fraud, which the defendants' committed by placing the allegedly
false prospectus in the purchasers' hands.55 The court, however, held
that the mailing of misleading prospectuses from abroad to United States
citizens in the United States to induce them to purchase the IOS securi-
ties would support jurisdiction for those plaintiffs' Rule 10b-5 claims.5 6
Turning to foreign citizens and to United States citizens residing abroad,
the court held that "[w]hile merely preparatory activities in the United
States are not enough to trigger application of the securities laws for in-
jury to foreigners located abroad, they are sufficient when the injury is to
Americans so resident.
57
The Bersch court distinguished the members of the class action both in
terms of the conduct and the injury necessary to confer subject matter
jurisdiction over the class members' Rule lOb-5 claims.5 Specifically,
51. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
52. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 989 (footnotes omitted). The plaintiffs' expert concluded that
the IOS collapse resulted in a deterioration of both domestic and foreign investor confi-
dence, thereby causing a "'steep decline"' in foreign purchases of United States securi-
ties. See icL at 987-88 (quoting plaintiff's expert). This decline in investor confidence also
led to a redemption of mutual fund shares, causing a ripple effect that depressed the
prices of American securities. See iL at 988 (quoting plaintiff's expert). Finally, the IOS
collapse destroyed an offshore investing industry in which European investors "'were
channeled into American securities markets."' Id. (quoting plaintiff's expert). One com-
mentator rightly has argued that "[i]f ever the courts were to be concerned with promot-
ing Congress' goal of protecting domestic markets, these facts should have triggered that
concern." Matson, supra note 5, at 151.
53. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 988.
54. According to the district court, the defendants held numerous meetings in New
York at which the underwriters, their attorneys, and the accounting firm initiated, organ-
ized, and structured the IOS public offering. See id. at 985 n.24. The defendants also
discussed the IOS offering with the SEC and retained lawyers and accountants to review
IOS operations and to prepare reports. See &L Further, the defendants drafted part of
the prospectus in New York and showed these completed drafts in New York to potential
secondary underwriters. See id. Last, the defendants opened bank accounts in New
York in which to deposit the proceeds of the offering before remittance to IOS. See id.
55. See id. at 992.
56. See id. at 991. The court did not address the question of sales within the United
States to foreign citizens. See id. at 993.
57. Id at 992.
58. See id. at 993.
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Bersch requires a higher degree of domestic conduct by the defendant as
the fraud victim's relationship with the United States becomes more at-
tenuated. Thus, under Bersch, a foreign plaintiff residing outside the
United States must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct within the
United States directly caused his loss.5 9
In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly recognized that its dis-
tinction among class members was based on policy considerations, not
the Exchange Act or its legislative history.' Hence, the court reasoned
that Congress would not have intended to devote the scarce judicial re-
sources of the United States to predominately foreign transactions."
In a companion case to Bersch, 1IT v. Vencap, Ltd.,62 the Second Cir-
cuit applied the same analysis, but identified a new congressional intent.
There, the court held that subject matter jurisdiction existed over a
Bahamanian corporation alleged to have defrauded a Luxembourg in-
vestment trust when the acts that consummated the fraud occurred
within the United States. 3 Applying Bersch, the Vencap court focused
on the "wickedness of particular transactions and.., whether they were
engineered from the United States."6 Accordingly, the court found that
negotiations and document drafting in the United States alone were in-
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. The court concluded, however, that
the defendant's use of his attorney's office as a "base" from which to
solicit foreign clients and to maintain records of transactions could be
regarded "substantively as the acts that consummated the fraud,"66 not
"merely evidencing [the defendant's] fraudulent intention." 67 In reach-
59. See id. The Bersch court concluded that the Exchange Act's antifraud provisions:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the United
States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance
occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident abroad if, but
only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance in the United
States have significantly contributed thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the
United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the United States
directly caused such losses.
Id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 985 (stating that a court "must seek to determine whether Congress
would have wished the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement
agencies to be devoted to [predominately foreign transactions] rather than leave the prob-
lem to foreign countries").
62. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). Vencap was a companion case to Bersch and was
decided on the same day. In Vencap, IIT alleged that Richard Pistell, a foreign resident
of the United States and a principle in the defendant Bahamian venture capital firm,
Vencap, fraudulently induced IIT to become a preferred shareholder in Vencap and then
misappropriated Vencap's assets for his personal use.
63. See id. at 1018.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 1011-13, 1018.




ing this conclusion, the court announced a new rationale-that Congress
did not intend for "the United States to be used as a base for manufactur-
ing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled
only to foreigners." 68
The Second Circuit further refined the Bersch distinction between "di-
rectly causing" and "merely preparatory" conduct in Fidenas AG v.
Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull
S.A.69 In Fidenas, a German dealer in commercial paper and the Baha-
mian and Swiss companies he managed brought a Rule lOb-5 action
against French and Swiss computer companies alleging that they had is-
sued fraudulent promissory notes to his clients.7 0 To obtain American
jurisdiction, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' American parent
corporation had attempted to conceal the fraud."' The Second Circuit
held, however, that the alleged cover-up was "'secondary and ancil-
lary"' to the "'essential core of the alleged fraud [which] took place in
Switzerland.' "72 Therefore, the parent corporation's acts did not di-
rectly cause the foreign plaintiffs' losses 3 and were insufficient to confer
jurisdiction. 4
While retaining the concept that a defendant's acts in the United
States must directly cause a foreign plaintiff's loss, the Second Circuit has
incorporated a comparative component into its subject matter jurisdic-
tion analysis. In IIT v. Cornfeld, 5 an action related to Vencap, the court
held that, absent specific effects on the American exchanges or American
investors, substantial fraudulent conduct must occur within the United
68. Id. at 1017.
69. 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979).
70. See id, at 7-8.
71. See id. at 8.
72. Id. at 10 (quoting district court opinion).
73. See id
74. See id.
75. 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980). Cornfeld, one of thirteen actions brought by the
liquidators of the International Investment Trust ("UIT"), presents a complex factual pat-
tern. For a detailed treatment of the facts, see IIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209, 211-14
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980). In short, the plain-
tiff, IIT, was a Luxembourg trust fund holding a portfolio of securities investments in
which several thousand fundholders participated. Before IIT entered bankruptcy under
Luxembourg law, two Americans, including Cornfeld, controlled the fund through a se-
ries of offshore shell companies organized in Luxembourg, Panama, and Canada. These
companies were operated from Switzerland. The challenged transactions involved three
IIT purchases of securities of several companies owned by a third American, King, who
offered investments in natural resource tax shelters. First, IIT purchased S8 million in
subordinated convertible debentures, issued in Europe on the Eurodollar market, from a
wholly-owned Netherlands Antilles subsidiary of the American company. Although the
bulk of IIT's purchases were made abroad, IIT purchased $50,000 in debentures through
a third company in the United States. Second, IIT purchased S16.8 million in common
stock of another King company on the United States over-the-counter market. Last, IIT
purchased a $12 million convertible note from a third King company. IT's liquidators




States for a United States court to assert jurisdiction over a predomi-
nantly foreign securities fraud claim."6 The court, however, construed
Bersch to require a comparison of the degree of domestic and foreign
conduct involved in the fraudulent transaction." Thus, although the do-
mestic conduct in Cornfeld appeared similar to that which the Bersch
court had found "merely preparatory," the court held that the district
court had jurisdiction over the foreign investment fund's Rule 1Ob-5
claim.78
Distinguishing Bersch, the Cornfeld court concluded that the United
States citizenship of both the defendants and the issuer, as well as the
substantial preparation of the prospectus and financial statements in the
United States, gave the United States a greater interest in regulating the
allegedly fraudulent cross-border securities issuance.79 Significantly, the
Cornfeld court signaled that the principles established in Bersch "do not
lead ineluctably to one result or the other."80
The Second Circuit also has applied its subject matter jurisdiction
analysis to assert jurisdiction over a foreign plaintiff's fraud claim where
literature inducing the securities transaction clearly emanated from the
United States and the resulting trades were executed on an American
exchange. In Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co. ,81 the court held that the
drafting of promotional literature in the United States and the execution
of trading orders on an American securities market were sufficient to
confer jurisdiction over a foreign plaintiff's securities fraud claim even
though the bulk of the alleged fraudulent conduct occurred abroad.82 In
76. See Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 920.
77. Thus, a court's "[d]etermination whether American activities 'directly' caused
losses to foreigners depends not only on how much was done in the United States but also
on how much (here how little) was done abroad." Id. at 920-21.
78. See id. at 920 ("[W]hile many of the acts in the United States in this case were
similar to those in Bersch, the relativity is entirely different because of the lack here of the
foreign activity so dominant in Bersch.").
79. See id. at 918:
[W]e do not mean to suggest that either the American nationality of the is-
suer or consummation of the transaction in the United States is either a neces-
sary or a sufficient factor .... but rather that the presence of both these factors
points strongly toward applying the anti-fraud provisions of our securities laws.
80. Id. at 913.
81. 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983). Although Psimenos involved the Commodities Ex-
change Act rather than the Exchange Act, the court assumed that the statutes' antifraud
standards were identical and applied the subject matter jurisdiction analysis relevant to
transnational securities fraud cases.
82. See id. at 1046. In Psimenos, the plaintiff, a Greek citizen, contacted a Greek
affiliate of E.F. Hutton ("Hutton-Greece") to explore opening a commodities futures
trading account. See id. at 1043. Hutton-Greece's money managers promised Psimenos
that highly qualified managers in Hutton's New York office would supervise continuously
his account and gave Psimenos a flyer containing a tear-off postcard to send to New York
to obtain additional information. See id. Relying on these statements, Psimenos opened
a discretionary trading account with Hutton-Greece, directing his Hutton-Greece ac-
count manager to follow a conservative investment strategy. See id. After excessive trad-
ing in his account and unauthorized speculative investments resulted in a $200,000 loss,
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reversing the district court's dismissal of the claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the court observed that "[a]lthough most of the
fraudulent misrepresentations alleged in the complaint occurred outside
the United States, the trading contracts that consummated the transac-
tions were often executed in New York."83 Thus, according to the court,
the trades executed on the American commodities markets constituted
the final act in Hutton's alleged fraud on Psimenos and "could hardly be
called 'preparatory activity' not subject to review. '"" In reaching this
conclusion, the Psimenos court reasoned that "Congress did not . . .
want United States commodities markets to be used as a base to consum-
mate schemes concocted abroad, particularly when the perpetrators are
agents of American corporations.""5
The Second Circuit's decisions concerning subject matter jurisdiction
over a foreign plaintiff's Rule lOb-5 claim reflect two concerns. First,
under the "effects" test, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged
securities fraud produced a direct, specific economic effect on the United
States securities markets or American investors. Second, in applying the
"conduct" test, the Second Circuit requires that a higher degree of mate-
rially fraudulent conduct occur within the United States as a plaintiff's
connection to the United States becomes more attenuated. Thus, in the
case of a foreign plaintiff, the defendant's conduct in the United States
must exceed "merely preparatory" acts and directly cause the foreign
plaintiff's alleged loss. Reflecting its reputation as the preeminent court
in the field of securities law, the Second Circuit's subject matter jurisdic-
tion analysis has influenced its sister circuits.
C. The Sister Circuits and the Application of Rule lob-5 to
Transnational Securities Activities
The Third, Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits also have
considered whether a federal court should exercise subject matter juris-
diction over transnational securities fraud claims. Adopting the Second
Circuit's analysis, these courts have examined whether the defendant's
conduct within the United States was "merely preparatory" or "signifi-
cant" to the alleged securities fraud. Despite their formal adherence to
the Second Circuit's analysis, however, several of these courts require a
relatively low degree of conduct within the United States in connection
with the sale or purchase of securities before exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over a foreign plaintiff's Rule lOb-5 claim. 6
Psimenos brought an action under the antifraud provisions of the Commodities Exchange
Act. See id. at 1044.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 1046. The court interpreted Bersch to "reveal[ that our true concern was
that we entertain suits by aliens only where conduct material to the completion of the
fraud occurred in the United States. Mere preparatory activities, and conduct far re-
moved from the consummation of the fraud, will not suffice to establish jurisdiction." Id.
86. The exception is the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
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In SEC v. Kasser,87 the Third Circuit asserted jurisdiction over a SEC
action against an American citizen and other corporate defendants for
allegedly defrauding a Canadian corporation, the Manitoba Develop-
ment Fund, in the purchase and sale of various securities.88 Applying
the "effects" test, the Kasser court noted that the securities involved in
the transaction were neither traded on an American exchange nor sold to
any United States citizen.89 Hence, following Bersch, the court con-
cluded that the defendants' fraudulent acts had no specific effects in the
United States sufficient to confer jurisdiction.90 Turning to the defend-
ants' conduct in the United States, however, the Third Circuit observed
that "significant conduct ... form[ing] part of the defendants' scheme"
occurred in the United States and was sufficient to confer jurisdiction.9
Accordingly, the Kasser court held that subject matter jurisdiction ex-
isted over a predominantly foreign securities fraud case "where at least
some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this
country."
92
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit expressly adopted the
Second Circuit's reasoning and declined to "immunize, for strictly juris-
dictional reasons, defendants who unleash from this country a pervasive
scheme to defraud a foreign corporation."93 Unlike the Second Circuit,
however, the Kasser court analyzed the significance of the defendants'
conduct to the actual fraud in terms of the quantity or extent of conduct
within the United States. Specifically, the Kasser court measured the
"sum total" of the defendants' actions in the United States against the
Compare Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (jurisdic-
tion under the conduct test requires domestic conduct that "directly causes" the foreign
plaintiff's loss and is more than "merely preparatory") with SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109,
114 (3d Cir.) (jurisdiction proper "where at least some activity designed to further a
fraudulent scheme occurs within this country"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
87. 548 F.2d 109, 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
88. The Canadian Manitoba Development Fund was the sole victim of the defend-
ants' securities fraud. See id. at 110.
89. See id. at 112.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 111-12. The court noted the following: various negotiations occurred in
the United States; one investment contract was executed in the United States; the defend-
ants used the mails and telephone to further the scheme; the defendants incorporated
front companies in the United States; and, lastly, that the defendants established an ac-
count in a New York bank in which to deposit Manitoba's payments. See id. at Il1.
Further, the court looked to the pleadings to find other activities the defendant conducted
in the United States, including the maintenance of records, the drafting of agreements
executed abroad, and the transmittal of funds to and from the United States. See id.
The court, however, failed to discuss the significance of these activities to the fraudulent
scheme or to indicate their relative significance to its decision.
92. Id. at 114. This has been coined the "minimal conduct" approach. See generally
Taylor, supra note 5 (arguing that the Third and Eighth Circuits' minimal conduct ap-
proach provides greater deterrence against transnational securities fraud than the Second
Circuit's approach).
93. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir.) (citing Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972)), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
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extent of the defendants' conduct in Vencap and Bersch.94 It then con-
cluded that the defendants' activities, taken together, were "essential to
the plan to defraud the [Manitoba] Fund."95
The Eighth Circuit also has followed a "sum total" approach.96 In
Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc.,9 the
Eighth Circuit held that a district court has jurisdiction over a cross-
border securities transaction where the defendants' conduct in the United
States significantly furthered a fraudulent scheme.
98
For the Continental Grain court, the locus of the actual fraud or eco-
nomic injury was not critical to its analysis.99 Rather, like the Third
Circuit, the court focused on the extent of the defendants' conduct in the
United States 100 as well as their nationality.0 1 Accordingly, the court
94. See id at 115 ("[I]t appears that there was much more United States-based activ-
ity in the present case than in Bersch ....").
95. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit, like the Second Circuit, ex-
pressly recognized that its decision to apply Rule lOb-5 involved a policy decision. See
id at 116; see alsosupra note 32 and accompanying text (listing courts' policy rationales).
96. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 526 (8th Cir. 1973) (applying
"totality of the circumstances" standard).
97. 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979). In Continental Grain, the plaintiff, Continental
Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. ("Continental Grain"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of an
American corporation, Continental Grain Corp., was incorporated in Australia. See id
at 411. The defendant, Pacific Oilseeds, Inc. ("Pacific Oilseeds"), also was an Australian
company. See id
Continental Grain negotiated to purchase Pacific Oilseeds with Australia Chemical
Holdings, Ltd. ("Australia Chemical"), POI, an American corporation and an American
citizen. See id At the time of the stock purchase, Pacific Oilseeds had a ten-year licens-
ing agreement with defendant Northrup, King & Co. ("Northrup"), an American com-
pany, under which Pacific Oilseeds received hybrid seedstock. See id This licensing
agreement, and its continued availability, constituted Pacific Oilseeds' primary assets.
See id After learning of Continental Grain's intention to purchase POI, Northrup in-
formed POI by telephone and mail that it would reclaim the seedstock when the licensing
agreement terminated in six months. See id at 412. Australian Chemical, who was act-
ing as an agent for the sellers, agreed to withhold this information from Continental
Grain. See id. at 411.
The contract for the sale of Pacific Oilseed to Continental Grain was executed in Cali-
fornia, though the closing occurred in Australia. See id at 412-13. At the closing, Conti-
nental Grain received the Pacific Oilseeds stock certificates and made initial payment of
the purchase price in Australian dollars, which was converted to dollars and wired to the
United States. See id at 413. When the licensing agreement expired, Northrup brought
suit to obtain possession of the seedstock. See id Continental Grain then filed suit, alleg-
ing that defendants violated § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 by conspiring to withhold from Con-
tinental Grain the information that Northrup intended to reclaim the seedstock when the
licensing agreement terminated. See id
98. See id. at 421 (jurisdiction appropriate where conduct in the United States "was
in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme and was significant with respect to its accom-
plishment"). In defining "significant," the court noted that "[t]he range of significant
conduct should ... be fairly inclusive" and "[c]onsistent with the general purpose of the
securities laws to mandate the highest standards of conduct in securities transactions."
Id
99. See id at 417, 420 n.17.
100. See id at 420 & n.17.
101. The court, however, stated that the defendants' nationality did not have any "in-
dependent significance for jurisdictional purposes." Id at 417. Yet, the nationality of
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concluded that the defendants devised and completed the fraudulent
scheme in the United States'0 2 and then " 'exported' [it] to Australia."'1 3
It therefore held that jurisdiction was proper--even though the sole vic-
tim of the allegedly fraudulent securities transaction was a foreign corpo-
ration, the stock purchase involved shares not listed or traded on an
American exchange, the actual negotiations of the purchase agreement
and closing occurred outside the United States, and the domestic conduct
largely consisted of the use of the mail and telephone.
The Ninth Circuit extended Rule lOb-5's reach to its outermost limits
in Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz. ' 4 There, the Ninth Circuit held that a
district court had jurisdiction over a sale of foreign securities between
foreign corporations and a foreign citizen where the only conduct in the
United States was a repetition of a false representation first made abroad.
In reaching this holding, the court concluded that the defendant's confir-
mation of his first misrepresentation by his silence at a Los Angeles meet-
ing was " 'material' because immediately thereafter defendants signed
and plaintiff was induced to execute the agreement."' 05 In concluding
that the Los Angeles meeting was sufficient to establish jurisdiction, the
Grunenthal court stated that "to hold otherwise could make it conve-
nient for foreign citizens and corporations to use this country .. to
further fraudulent securities schemes."'10 6
defendants POI, Claussen, and Northrup clearly was one factor in the court's analysis.
See id. at 420.
102. See id.
103. Id. It should be noted that the Continental Grain court held that Continental
Grain could not satisfy the requirements of the "effects" test. See id. at 417.
104. 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983). In Grunenthal, a Swiss citizen sold stock in a Mexi-
can firm he controlled through a Bahamian trust to a German purchaser. See id. at 422.
The seller resided in Italy but occasionally spent time in the United States. See id. at 422
n.2. The German purchaser alleged that the Swiss seller made fraudulent statements
about the Mexican firm to induce him to acquire the company. See id. at 423. The
parties negotiated the purchase agreement in Germany and the Bahamas. See id. The
meeting at which the parties signed the contract of sale occurred in Los Angeles, but only
because the Swiss seller was visiting the city on other business. See id. (quoting the dis-
trict court opinion). The plaintiff alleged that, during the Los Angeles meeting, the seller
repeated an allegedly fraudulent statement. See id. (quoting district court opinion).
105. Id. at 425. In reversing the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint,
the court asserted that the fact that the parties' final meeting in Los Angeles was " 'based
on convenience'" was unimportant. Id.
The district court had dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp. 582, 588 (C.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 712 F.2d
421 (9th Cir. 1983). In declining jurisdiction, the district court found that the plaintiff
and the defendants were foreign citizens and that the securities involved in the transac-
tion were foreign, privately-held, and not traded on an American Exchange. See id. Fur-
ther, the district court noted that the Los Angeles meeting to execute the common stock
purchase was the only meeting, of three meetings, held in the United States. See id. It
also found the defendants' conduct in the meetings held abroad was "at least equal to"
the defendants' conduct in the United States, that the factual misrepresentation was first
made abroad, and that the meeting in the United States "was only for convenience." Id.
106. Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 425. While adopting the Third and Eighth Circuits' pol-
icy judgments, the Ninth Circuit also posited that "[a]ssertion of jurisdiction may en-
courage Americans-such as lawyers, accountants and underwriters-involved in
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The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has been the most resistant to asserting jurisdiction over foreign
plaintiffs' securities fraud claim. 10 In Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen &
Co.,' °8 the court declined to assert jurisdiction over German investors'
Rule lOb-5 claims against Arthur Andersen. There, the plaintiffs alleged
that Arthur Andersen knowingly provided a false and misleading audit
report to German investors interested in an intricate real estate invest-
ment and tax shelter plan."19
The Zoelsch court observed that Arthur Andersen prepared certain
materials related to the audit report in the United States, but that an
Arthur Andersen subsidiary prepared the final audit report in Germany
and distributed the report only in Germany to German citizens."10 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that Arthur Andersen's alleged misrepresenta-
tions and omissions did not directly cause the German investors' loss and
thus were not within the district court's jurisdiction under the Exchange
Act."'11 In reaching this conclusion, the court narrowly read Cornfeld to
require that a defendant's alleged conduct in the United States include all
the material elements necessary to establish a Rule lOb-5 violation."'
The D.C. Circuit, however, reluctantly adopted the "more restrictive"
Second Circuit approach," 3 finding the circuit court's interpretation of
congressional intent "somewhat odd."" 4 Compared to the other circuit
transnational securities sales to behave responsibly and thus may prevent the develop-
ment of relaxed standards that 'could spill over into work on American securities transac-
tions.'" Id (quoting Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 553, 571 (1976)).
107. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Writ-
ing for the court, Judge Robert Bork stated that the court was "inclined to doubt that an
American court should ever assert jurisdiction over domestic conduct that causes loss to
foreign investors." Id
108. See id
109. The tax shelter was offered by a West German limited partnership and involved
an American real estate investment partnership. See id at 28. The German plaintiffs
alleged that the American accounting firm fraudulently induced them to purchase the
securities by assisting its German subsidiary in preparing an audit report containing false
representations and material omissions concerning the sale. See id
110. See icL
111. See id
112. See id at 31 (citing IT v. Corafeld, 619 F.2d 909, 920-21 (2d Cir. 1980)). The
Zoeisch court read Cornfeld to require that
jurisdiction will lie in American courts where the domestic conduct com-
prises all the elements of a defendant's conduct necessary to establish a violation
of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5: the fraudulent statements or misrepresenta-
tions must originate in the United States, must be made with scienter and in
connection with the sale or purchase of securities, and must cause the harm to
those who claim to be defrauded, even though the actual reliance and damages
may occur elsewhere.
Id
113. See id. at 32.
114. Id ("Were it not for the Second Circuit's preeminence in the field of securities
law, and our desire to avoid a multiplicity of jurisdictional tests, we might be inclined to
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courts' judicial activism," 5 the Second Circuit's analysis thus repre-
sented the least objectionable choice for the Zoelsch court.
II. REFINING THE CONDUCT ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit's conduct analysis seeks to assess whether a de-
fendant's activities in the United States were "merely preparatory" to or
"directly caused" a foreign plaintiff's loss. These characterizations,
however, are inherently subjective. Yet, the increasingly international
character of the United States' securities markets calls for a well-deline-
ated standard for determining the reach of Rule lOb-5.' 1 6
The Second Circuit's jurisdictional test also fails to recognize the in-
creasing importance of the foreign investor to the stability of the United
States' financial markets as well as to the overseas capital-raising activi-
ties of United States firms. Indeed, the stability of the United States'
financial markets, as well as the disclosure principle underlying its securi-
ties laws, contribute to foreign investor confidence in the integrity of the
United States' securities markets. 1 7 This foreign investor confidence
creates a comparative advantage in capital-raising activities for American
corporations.1 8 Conversely, securities fraud discourages foreign inves-
doubt that an American court should ever assert jurisdiction over domestic conduct that
causes loss to foreign investors.").
115. See id. at 33.
116. Several statistics illustrate this process of integration. The market in cross-border
offerings of bonds, including foreign and Eurobonds, expanded from $38.3 billion in 1980
to $231 billion in 1988. See Chuppe et al., supra note 1, at 57, 59. Similarly, the value of
equity-related securities issued to investors in markets outside the issuer's home-country
increased from $200 million in 1983 to $20.3 billion in 1987. See Warren, supra note 2, at
186 (1990). Foreign gross purchases and sales of United States debt and equity securities
increased from $122.9 billion and $75.2 billion in 1980 to $2.83 trillion and $482 billion,
respectively, in 1987. See Chuppe et al., supra note 1, at 77 (tbl. 9). Likewise, United
States gross purchases and sales of foreign debt and equity securities increased from $35.2
billion and $17.9 billion in 1980 to $405.9 billion and $189.4 billion, respectively, in 1987.
See id.
117. In the 1980s, United States mutual funds became increasingly popular with indi-
vidual investors in foreign markets. See Internationalization of the Securities Markets,
supra note 1, at 11-18. Indeed, United States broker-dealers, investment advisors, and
investment companies have increased significantly their activities in foreign markets to
draw upon an additional source of liquidity to supplement their United States activities.
See id. Moreover, investment companies registered in the United States commonly dis-
tribute their securities in foreign markets. See id. Further, since 1985, there has been a
noticeable trend for price movements in the United States equity market to be highly
correlated with price movements in foreign equity markets. See Chuppe et al., supra note
I, at 36-37 (tbl. 3).
118. See Charles T. Plambeck, Capital Neutrality and Coordinated Supervision: Les-
sons for International Securities Regulation from the Law of International Taxation and
Banking, 9 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. 171, 197 (1988) (observing that high disclosure
standards favor the import of capital and are neutral to the export of capital); see also
Van Zandt, supra note 5, at 61 (arguing that increased demand for capital among indus-
trial and financial borrowers in domestic markets has led borrowers to enter international
capital markets, which permits borrowers to raise capital at lower costs than if restricted
to domestic capital markets).
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tors from purchasing American securities,119 thereby increasing the
transaction costs associated with capital-raising activities. 2"
The current refusal to entertain a foreign plaintiff's private action
under the Exchange Act where the defendant's acts in the United States
are "merely preparatory" to the consummated fraud has significant con-
sequences. Not only does it impugn the perceived fairness1 2' and integ-
rity of the United States' securities markets, but it also threatens the
ability of American corporations to raise capital in foreign markets.
To remedy this deficiency, this Note proposes a "purposeful use" test
to supplement the Second Circuit's conduct analysis.
A. The "Purposeful Use" Standard Defined
Under the "purposeful use" test, a federal court should assert jurisdic-
tion over a foreign plaintiff's fraud claim where the defendant purposely
has used its apparent affiliation with the United States to induce a foreign
plaintiff to enter into a fraudulent securities transaction."2 The "pur-
119. See Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regula-
tion of Insider Trading, 41 Bus. Law. 223, 227-28 (1985) ("[]f investors do not anticipate
fair treatment, they will avoid investing in securities... [and] capital formation through
securities offerings will become less attractive and more difficult."); Pamela Jimenez, In-
ternational Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act and Memoranda of Understanding, 31
Harv. Int'l LJ. 295 (1990) (noting that capital formation process depends on public con-
fidence in the fairness and integrity of securities markets).
Some commentators assert that the exercise of jurisdiction over cross-border securities
transactions will discourage prospective investors from participating in United States is-
suances and trades and thus deflect capital flows away from the United States. See, eg.,
Barbara S. Thomas, Internationalization of the Securities Markets" An Empirical Analy-
sis, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 155, 158 (1982) (discussing whether the application of domes-
tic securities laws to cross-border transactions creates friction between countries and
impedes capital flows). Arguably, the imposition of the United States' registration provi-
sions and enforcement mechanisms upon the internal operations of a foreign business
subject to the regulatory authority of its domiciliary country may deter firms from regis-
tering on American exchanges. Yet, this may not be the case for investor-related activi-
ties. The New York and London securities exchanges, the two most comprehensively
regulated markets in the world, have emerged as the largest international securities mar-
kets. See Warren, supra note 2, at 189.
120. See Plambeck, supra note 118, at 197.
121. See Extraterritorial Reach of the US. Securities Laws, Fin. Reg. Rep., Fin. Times
(London), June 1989, at 28, 30 (noting foreign concerns that Zoelsch court's restrictions
on foreign plaintiffs' access to United States courts in securities matters created "a
'double standard' of jurisprudence for U.S. citizens on the one hand and non-U.S. inves-
tors on the other").
122. See Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, supra note 5,
at 570-71 (arguing that federal courts should assert jurisdiction over defendant who has
"deliberately utilized uniquely American resources" to mislead the foreign investor "into
believing that [his] investment [was] protected by the strict American securities laws").
The Supreme Court has employed a "purposeful availment" test in defining the extent
of a court's personal jurisdiction over an actor outside the state in which the court sits.
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); World-Wide Volk-
swagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958). Subject matter jurisdiction, however, should not be confused with personal
jurisdiction, which involves the court's ability to exercise its power over an individual in
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poseful use" test, however, does not provide a basis for asserting subject
matter jurisdiction over a predominantly foreign securities transaction
absent conduct in the United States.
Rule lOb-5 prohibits any person participating in the purchase or sale
of a security from employing a fraudulent scheme or engaging in conduct
that would operate as a fraud.' 23 Liability for a Rule lOb-5 violation,
however, also requires the direct or indirect use of the U.S. mails or an
instrumentality of interstate commerce in connection with the allegedly
fraudulent transaction.' 24 Accordingly, a fraudulent securities transac-
tion conducted entirely outside the United States could not violate the
Exchange Act.'25 Hence, a foreign plaintiff's fraud claim necessarily
must involve certain conduct in the United States. Thus, where a court
deems the defendant's conduct in the United States "merely prepara-
tory" to the actual fraud committed abroad, and therefore insufficient in
itself to confer jurisdiction, the court then would assess whether the de-
fendant purposely had used its apparent affiliation with the United States
to induce the foreign plaintiff to execute the challenged transaction. If
the defendant consummated the actual fraud in the United States, a court
would assert jurisdiction under the "conduct" test alone, without resort-
ing to the "purposeful use" analysis. The "purposeful use" concept thus
would supplement the "conduct" test where a court finds a defendant's
conduct in the United States preparatory to a securities fraud committed
overseas.
The "purposeful use" test requires a court to identify the defendant's
intent in determining whether a cross-border securities transaction comes
within the jurisdiction of the Exchange Act. A federal court may infer a
defendant's intent from certain objective manifestations, such as specific
acts or documents, drawn from the pleadings or from other relevant evi-
dence presented to the court.' 26
order to adjudicate his rights and liabilities stemming from a particular transaction or
event. See Wright & Miller, supra note 13, § 1350, at 196. Although subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are distinct concepts, the policy concerns are gener-
ally similar: fairness. In the context of personal jurisdiction, the Court has held that due
process requires that a defendant "purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State." World-Wide Volkswagon, 444 U.S. at 297 (quoting
Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253.).
123. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
124. See id.
125. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207 n.2, 209-10 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). Dismissal, however,
is not mandated even though a challenged transaction does not involve securities regis-
tered in the United States or traded on an organized United States market. See Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir.) ("It is elementary that the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws apply to many transactions which are neither
within the registration requirements nor on organized American markets."), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975); see also Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524 (8th
Cir. 1973) (concluding that Exchange Act applies "even though the securities are foreign
ones that had not been purchased on an American exchange").
126. A motion to dismiss an action under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) raises the question of
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First, a court may draw inferences regarding a defendant's intent from
the defendant's apparent affiliation with the United States. Although no
federal court has asserted subject matter jurisdiction over a cross-border
securities transaction solely on the basis of the defendant's apparent afili-
ation with the United States or the defendant's United States citizen-
ship,12 7 in some cases, the defendant's affiliation or nationality emerges as
a critical factor. 2 8 In IT v. Cornfeld, 29 for instance, the Second Circuit
stated that the "American nationality of the issuer ... points strongly
toward applying the anti-fraud provisions of our securities laws."' 30
Similarly, in Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour
L'Infonnatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A., 3 the court, although reaching
a different conclusion than the Cornfeld court, also examined the defend-
ant's citizenship.132 Moreover, in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., the
Second Circuit posited that a foreign plaintiff's securities lawsuit against
a foreign company for activities in the United States might be properly
dismissed where the foreign company was clearly identified with that for-
eign country.1M
The emphasis placed on the defendant's affiliation or citizenship with
the United States under a "purposeful use" analysis finds support in in-
ternational law. 135 Although the nationality principle has not been ap-
plied as an independent basis for jurisdiction by the United States'
a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction over an action. Under Rule 12(h)(3), a court
may dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction upon the motion of the
parties orsua sponte at any point in the proceedings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). When
considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court is not
restricted to the allegations contained in the pleadings, but may review any evidence,
such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve the factual dispute concerning the existence of
jurisdiction. See Wright & Miller, supra note 13, § 1350, at 213.
127. See e.g., Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592
F.2d 409, 417 (8th Cir. 1979) ("Nor do we view the nationality of [the] defendants ... as
having any independent significance for jurisdictional purposes.").
128. See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1043 (2d Cir. 1983) (observ-
ing that defendant's promotional materials clearly indicated foreign entity's affiliation
with its NY office); lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 920 (2d Cir. 1980) ("We think Con-
gress would have been considerably more interested in assuring against the fraudulent
issuance of securities constituting obligations of American rather than purely foreign
business.").
129. 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
130. Id at 918 (citation omitted).
131. 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979).
132. See id. at 8. There, the Second Circuit quoted with approval the district court's
conclusion that "the critical consideration is that the plaintiffs, the defendants, and the
transaction are foreign" and declined jurisdiction. Id
133. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
134. See id at 986-87:
Assuming that... the underwriting related.. . to a large foreign industrial
company clearly identified with a foreign country rather than with the United
States, e.g., Rolls-Royce, Mercedes-Benz or Fiat, we do not believe the activities
in the United States... would justify an American court in taking jurisdiction
in a suit for damages by foreign plaintiffs.
135. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
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courts, 1 3 6 a defendant's clear association with the United States would
strengthen a federal court's assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign plain-
tiff's securities fraud case where the defendant undertook preparatory
acts in the United States.
Second, a defendant's acts or statements designed to create the impres-
sion that a foreign transaction was covered by the United States' securi-
ties laws also would permit a court to draw inferences concerning the
defendant's intent. In Psimenos, for example, the foreign defendant's
identification with an American corporation and the foreign plaintiff's
reliance on those representations in conducting business with the defend-
ant appear to have been significant to the court's holding.' 37 Similarly, in
Wandschneider v. Industrial Incomes, Inc.,38 the court implicitly em-
ployed a "purposeful use" analysis.
In Wandschneider, a German citizen brought a securities fraud claim
against a New York corporation engaged in the sale and management of
an offshore mutual fund, Industrial Incomes, Inc. of North America. 139
She had purchased the Industrial Incomes shares in Germany from the
defendant's German agent who, in soliciting her participation, falsely
stated that the SEC regulated the fund."' Moreover, the defendant's
agent provided the plaintiff with a prospectus, which had been drafted in
the United States and then distributed to the defendant's agents
abroad.'4' The prospectus implied that Industrial Incomes was regis-
tered with the SEC and was subject to its regulation and supervision.'42
The prospectus also emphasized the fund manager's membership in the
National Association of Security Dealers, which it described as "regulat-
ing the practices and activities of its members pursuant to authority con-
136. Under the nationality principle of international law, a state may exercise jurisdic-
tion over a citizen of that state for conduct occurring abroad. However, United States
courts view the nationality principle as an exceptional basis for jurisdiction. See e.g.,
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 935 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (noting that jurisdiction based on domestic conduct or effects, not nationality, is
customary and preferred basis of jurisdiction).
137. See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1043 (2d Cir. 1985). The
Psimenos court observed that
Psimenos was also informed by flyer, printed by Hutton, of the quality and
experience of Hutton's money managers. The flyer touted that Hutton's 'exper-
ienced and qualified staff continually monitors the performance of each current
Hutton approved manager...' and that 'Hutton's professionals thoroughly an-
alyze and evaluate these managers in a manner beyond the resources of the
ordinary investor.' The flyer contained a tear-off post card to send to Hutton's
New York office for more information.
Relying on the statements, Psimenos opened an account with Hutton's Ath-
ens office ....
Id.
138. [1971-72 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 93,422, at 92,054 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
139. See id.
140. See id. at 92,060.
141. See id. at 92,058.
142. See id. at 92,059.
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ferred by Act of the United States Congress." '143 At the end of the
prospectus, however, it briefly stated that the fund's shares "'have not
been registered under the United States Securities Act of 1933,... and
the [SEC] has not processed this General Prospectus.'"',
Despite the predominantly foreign character of the transaction, the
district court asserted its jurisdiction under the Exchange Act. 45 In
reaching this conclusion, the court found that the defendant's prospectus
was a "cleverly deceptive document, clearly devised to impress a foreign
investor"'" with Industrial Incomes' connection to the United States
and its affiliation with prominent American banks.
B. The "Purposeful Use" Standard Applied
The "purposeful use" test offers a valuable supplement to the tradi-
tional conduct analysis. Consider two examples-Finch v. Marathon Se-
curities Corp. 47 and Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz. 143
In Finch, a British investor sued an American corporation, Marathon
Securities, alleging that the corporation's British representative misrepre-
sented the value of Vectron Electro-Physics, Ltd. ("Vectron"), a British
electronics company.149 Marathon had succeeded to the assets and as-
sumed the liabilities of Electronic International Capital Ltd. ("EICL"), a
Bermuda-based investment company that had negotiated the purchase
agreement. 5o Though based in Bermuda, both EICL and Marathon
were "substantially controlled"1'' by a United States firm. Further, six
of EICL's eight directors were American. 52 The negotiations regarding
the stock purchase occurred in London, though the purchase agreement
was signed in New York." 3 A substantially similar agreement later was
signed in London.15 This agreement stated that the offering was subject
to United States securities regulations "to the extent that the subject mat-
ter of the agreement is within the purview of [the Securities Act of 1933
143. IA
144. Id
145. See id at 92,055. Arguably, under the Second Circuit's "direct causation" analy-
sis, a court would not have asserted jurisdiction over the German investor's claim. First,
the plaintiff was foreign and her participation in the transaction was solicited by another
foreign citizen. Second, the drafting of the prospectus in the United States was a prepara-
tory act to the actual fraud, which the defendant's German agent committed abroad
when he first misrepresented the SEC's role in regulatory authority over the fund and
then reaffirmed that misrepresentation by providing the prospectus to prospective Ger-
man client.
146. Id at 92,062.
147. 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
148. 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983).
149. See Finch, 316 F. Supp. at 1347.
150. See id at 1346.






and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934]. ' ' l5
The Finch court declined jurisdiction. Under a "purposeful use" anal-
ysis, however, a court should have asserted jurisdiction. In reviewing the
purchase agreement's provisions as well as the apparent affiliation of
EICL with the United States, a court reasonably could conclude that the
defendant sought to create a misleading impression that American law
would protect the prospective foreign purchaser's investment. By assert-
ing jurisdiction under the "purposeful use" test, the court would have
protected the legitimate expectations of the foreign investor. Moreover,
the court would have maintained the equities between the parties to the
transaction, estopping Marathon from escaping civil liability simply be-
cause of the nationality of the defrauded plaintiff.,56
The "purposeful use" analysis also works in the reverse direction. In
Grunenthal, for example, the Ninth Circuit asserted jurisdiction over a
foreign plaintiff's fraud claim against a foreign defendant for a transac-
tion involving a foreign company.' 57 The only contact with the United
States was one meeting in Los Angeles where the parties executed the
purchase agreement. 15 In fact, the entire transaction had been negoti-
ated in Germany and the Bahamas, where the parties held the closing. 9
Reversing the district court," ° the Ninth Circuit held that the defend-
ant's confirmation by silence of a false statement first made abroad in-
duced the plaintiff to execute the agreement and thus was sufficient to
confer jurisdiction.16'
Under a "purposeful use" analysis, a court would have declined juris-
diction. The Los Angeles meeting, at the very least, was preparatory to
the fraud and none of the individual defendants was a United States
citizen. Further, none of the corporate defendants was affiliated with the
United States. Moreover, the challenged transaction involved foreign,
privately-held securities.' 62 Thus, the foreign defendants did not use the
perceived legal protection of the United States securities laws to induce
the plaintiff to participate in the transaction. A court, therefore, reason-
ably could conclude that the defendant did not attempt to use a perceived
association to the United States to induce the plaintiff to participate in
the transaction.
155. Id. at 1348.
156. See, eg., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 921 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[D]efendants with
whom we are here concerned acted in the United States and cannot fairly object to having
their conduct judged by its laws."); see also MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896
F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Having gone to such lengths to structure a transaction
not burdened by the securities laws, plaintiffs cannot expect to wrap themselves in their
protective mantle when the deal sours.").
157. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1983).
158. See id. at 423.
159. See id. at 422-23.
160. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp. 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 712
F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983).
161. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983).
162. See id. at 422.
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The "purposeful use" analysis offers a consistent and predictable stan-
dard. While the traditional "conduct" analysis seeks to define whether a
defendant's conduct in the United States was "merely preparatory" or
"directly caused" the plaintiff's loss---each an inherently subjective deter-
mination, the "purposeful use" analysis seeks to identify the defendant's
intent and to protect the parties' expectations. This supplement to the
traditional conduct analysis recognizes the increasing importance of the
foreign investor, but also provides a means by which to restrict a foreign
plaintiff's access to the United States' courts.
III. FORUM NON CONVENENS: A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO
JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS
Part II proposed an extension of a court's power to hear transnational
securities fraud cases. As the world's financial markets have become
more integrated, however, legitimate bases of jurisdiction frequently
overlap. These overlaps often result in the extension of one nation's se-
curities regulations to regulate conduct within the territory of another
country. Part III considers whether a court should dismiss a foreign
plaintiff's Rule lOb-5 action even though it has subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the claim.163 It briefly discusses an interest-based approach' 61
to resolving potential jurisdictional conflicts and concludes that such an
approach is inadequate. Instead, this Part advocates an approach based
on the traditional doctrine of forum non conveniens.
163. See Fisch, supra note 5, at 524-25 (arguing that courts have neglected to consider
whether a court should apply the Exchange Act to the allegedly fraudulent transaction,
even if the court possesses the power to hear the case).
164. There are distinctions among the several types of interest analysis designed to
indicate which law should govern a legal claim. A comprehensive discussion of these
approaches and their various offshoots, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. Gen-
erally, "all modem choice-of-law methods seek to identify the state whose law is most
appropriately applied." Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads"
An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 Am. J. Int'l L. 280, 287
n.31. (1982) [hereinafter Maier, Crossroads]. Accordingly, these approaches also involve
an attempt to identify and to weigh the various interests of different sovereign govern-
ments having contact with the challenged transaction or event. See id. Consequently, for
the purposes of this Note, these approaches will be discussed under the generic term of
"interest-based" and the distinctions between the various offshoots will not be developed.
For a sample of the various interest-based approaches, see Brainerd Currie, Selected Es-
says on the Conflict of Laws (1963); Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of
American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Summer 1987, at 11; Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws. A Critique of Interest Anal-
ysis, 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 (1984); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 Colum.
L. Rev. 277 (1990); Robert A. Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts Law, 81 Colum. L Rev.
1080 (1981); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of
Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for their Interaction, 163 R.C.A.D.I. 311
(1979); Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 Am. J.
Comp. L. 579 (1983); Winston P. Nagan, Conflicts Theory in Conflict: A Systematic Ap-
praisal of Traditional and Contemporary Theories, 3 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L 343
(1982); Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 315
(1972).
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A. The Existing Interest-Based Approach
The interest-based approach advocates that courts balance the inter-
ests of the United States and a foreign forum in regulating the challenged
transaction to determine whether the United States' jurisdiction over pre-
dominately foreign activity is "reasonable."' 6s In assessing whether ju-
risdiction is reasonable, a court should consider a variety of factors. 166
Moreover, even if jurisdiction is reasonable, a court has an "obliga-
tion" 67 to evaluate another state's interest in adjudicating the action and
"should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly
greater."16 8 This approach is related to the concept of international com-
ity. 16 9 Likewise, a conflict of laws approach, which is a variation of the
165. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1987) incorporates the interest-based approaches to resolving jurisdictional conflicts.
See Restatement (Third), supra note 19, § 416 (entitled "Jurisdiction to Regulate Activi-
ties Related to Securities"). Section 416 establishes several criteria by which the United
States may assert jurisdiction over a transnational securities transaction. See id.
§§ 416(1), (2). The United States' authority to exercise jurisdiction under § 416, how-
ever, is limited by § 403(2), which requires a court to evaluate whether exercising juris-
diction is "reasonable." See id. § 416(2). Section 403(2) suggests that a court assess the
following:
(a) ... the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, be-
tween the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity
to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed
to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulations is generally ac-
cepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. § 403(2).
For a comprehensive discussion of the Restatement (Third), see Karl M. Meessen,
Conflicts of Jurisdiction under the New Restatement, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer
1987, at 47. For an explicit application of the Restatement (Third) factors in the context
of transnational securities cases, see AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership,
740 F.2d 148, 153 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1984).
The case most often cited, both positively and negatively, as modern authority for judi-
cial interest balancing is Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985), an antitrust case. For a critical analysis of
the Timberlane court's analysis, see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Air-
lines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
166. See Restatement (Third), supra note 19, § 403(2).
167. See id. § 403(3).
168. Id.
169. Comity is "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
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interest-based approach, asserts that a court identify and apply the law of
the country where the plaintiff's cause of action arose.' 10 This approach
also requires a court to exercise restraint in applying domestic law in
light of the legislative, executive, and judicial acts of a foreign state. In
so doing, a court promotes comity and reduces the potential for infringe-
ment on another sovereign nation's interests. Like interest-balancing, the
list of factors to be considered is open-ended. 17 1
These interest-based approaches, however, are flawed. First, they fail
to recognize that a court is ill-equipped to identify, evaluate, and weigh
fairly the interests of both the United States and a foreign government. 172
The judiciary has neither the competence nor resources to assess the eco-
nomic, political, and social interests underlying a foreign state's poli-
cies. 173 Consequently, in practice, these interest-based approaches tend
to overstate domestic interests and to de-emphasize foreign government
interests. 74 Second, the interest-based approach represents an ad-hoc
decision-making process. Because its interest-balancing factors are sus-
ceptible to subjective evaluation, the interest-based approach fails to pro-
vide certainty or predictability. 175
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to interna-
tional duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens." Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). It is not required by international law, but a discretionary doc-
trine "enjoin[ing] forbearance in the exercise of legitimate jurisdiction when another sov-
ereign also has legitimate jurisdiction under international law." Maier, Crossroads, supra
note 164, at 281 n.1.
170. See Lowenfeld, supra note 164, at 329.
171. See Meessen, supra note 165, at 56; see also Restatement (Third), supra note 19,
§ 202(2).
172. The federal courts routinely assert that the United States' interest in punishing
fraudulent or manipulative conduct is entitled substantial weight and thus supports juris-
diction over predominately foreign transactions. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 263 (2d Cir.), modified by 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); see also Restatement (Third), supra note 19,
§ 416 cmt a. ("[A]n interest in punishing fraudulent or manipulative conduct is entitled
greater weight than are routine administrative requirements.").
173. See eg., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
949 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Those contacts which do purport to provide a basis for distin-
guishing between competing bases of jurisdiction, and which are thus crucial to the bal-
ancing process, generally incorporate purely political factors which the court is neither
qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of properly balancing.").
174. See Brilmayer, supra note 164, at 18 (arguing that interest analysis is "permeated
by the philosophy of unilateralism" so that a court will adhere to its own law rather than
making neutral choices between domestic and foreign law); Maier, Crossroads, supra note
164, at 317 (interest analysis "will usually reflect an understandable bias in favor of the
forum's policy"); see also Predictability and Comity, supra note 5, at 1323-25 (arguing
that interest-balancing approach "is not faithful to the principle of comity among
nations").
175. See Fisch, supra note 5, at 556-57 & n.194; Maier, Crossroads, supra note 164, at
319 ("[N]eeds of the states and their subjects in the international community will not be
well served unless the value of predictability is given high priority."); see also Reese,
supra note 164, at 316 (future planning requires predictability).
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B. The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
A more appropriate judicial response to the tensions arising from the
increased application of the Exchange Act to transnational securities ac-
tivities is embodied in the doctrine offorum non conveniens. 176 The doc-
trine of forum non conveniens refers to "the discretionary power of a
court to decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction whenever it appears
that the cause before it may be more appropriately tried elsewhere." 177
A grant of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens results in the
dismissal of the action in the United States court without prejudice to the
plaintiff to file suit in another forum."18 Forum non conveniens has been
applied in cases where an action should have been brought in a foreign
tribunal rather than a United States court. 17 9
The criteria relevant to forum non conveniens dismissals are not rigid
and thus allow courts the flexibility to respond to different factual set-
tings.18 Moreover, these criteria are better suited to judicial capabilities
than the interest-based factors. Indeed, the doctrine offers a method of
analysis that courts are competent to apply effectively and with which
judges are familiar.""1 Rather than weighing conflicting economic, so-
cial, or policy interests, forum non conveniens requires a court to assess
whether an alternative forum in which the plaintiff could sue is avail-
176. Forum non conveniens has been proposed as a means to reduce the friction inher-
ent in the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law. See John Byron
Sandage, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application of United
States Antitrust Law, 94 Yale L.J. 1693 (1985).
For discussions of the historical and legal background of the doctrine, see Paxton Blair,
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 1
(1929) and Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908
(1947); see also James D. Yellen, Note, Forum Non Conveniens: Standards for the Dis-
missal of Actions from United States Federal Courts to Foreign Tribunals, 5 Fordham Int'l
L.J. 533 (1982).
177. Blair, supra note 176, at 1.
178. The basis of the objection is the impropriety of the court's exercising jurisdiction
over the subject matter, not the court's lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 2-3.
179. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (dismissing wrongful
death and aviation product liability claims resulting from airplane accident in Scotland),
reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1164-65 (2d
Cir. 1978) (dismissing action based on management of mutual fund in Switzerland on
forum non conveniens grounds); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F.
Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissing wrongful death claims resulting from industrial
accident in India), modified on other grounds, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 871 (1987).
180. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 249-50; see also Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 527 (1947) (stating that "the ultimate inquiry is where [will]
trial ... best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice"); Williams v.
Green Bay & W. R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 554, 557 (1946) (doctrine designed as "instrument
of justice" and requires fact-specific analysis) (quoting Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
288 U.S. 123, 151 (Cardozo, J., dissenting)).
181. See Linwood G. Lawrence III, Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad Revisited: A
Decade of Development of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in International Liti-
gation in the Federal Courts, 17 Va. J. Int'l L. 755 (1977).
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able1" 2 and to determine whether adjudicating the claim in the plaintiff's
chosen forum would be disproportionately oppressive or vexatious to the
defendant or create administrative or legal complications for the court."'
The Supreme Court has set forth the relevant factors in a court's con-
sideration of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens in Piper Air-
craft Co. v Reyno.' 4 Observing that a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum
deserves less deference than a citizen's choice of forum,1" 5 the Court
identified and then weighed several private and public interest factors to
determine whether dismissal was appropriate.186 It then assessed
whether an alternative forum was available.18 7 Significantly, the Court
declined to engage in a comparative analysis of the rights, remedies, or
procedures available in the alternative forum.88 Rather, the Piper Air-
craft Court conducted a limited inquiry into whether an adequate forum
for the litigation existed."8 9 In so doing, the Court firmly rejected the
argument that possible changes in the substantive law governing the
plaintiff's cause of action was sufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss
for forum non conveniens.'90 Thus, absent evidence that the alternative
182. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (notingforum non con-
veniens "presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process
[and] ... furnishes criteria for choice between them").
183. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241.
184. 454 U.S. 235 (1981). In Piper Aircraft, an American personal representative of
Scottish citizens killed in an airplane accident in Scotland initiated a wrongful death
action in California state court against the Pennsylvania and Ohio manufacturers of the
plane and its propellers. The case was removed to federal district court in California and
then transferred to a federal district court in Pennsylvania. There, the court dismissed
the action on the grounds of forum non conveniens. See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479
F. Supp. 727, 738 (M.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 630 F.2d 149, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 454
U.S. 235 (1981). The Third Circuit reversed, finding that dismissal was inappropriate
where the Scottish law would deny plaintiffs a favorable theory of liability--strict prod-
uct liability. See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd,
454 U.S. 2235 (1981).
185. See PiperAircraft, 454 U.S at 255; see also id. at 255-56 n.23 (stating that citizen's
choice of forum is not dispositive and must be balanced against the "conveniences").
186. See iL at 241 n.6. The "private interest factors" include (1) access to sources of
proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses;
(3) the need to view the premises or site; and (4) other practical problems relating to
sources of proof or witnesses. See id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508
(1947)).
The "public interest factors" include (1) the administrative burdens of holding trial; (2)
local interest in having the controversy decided at home; (3) the interest in having the
trial in the forum whose law must govern; (4) avoidance of unnecessary problems in
conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law; and (5) the unfairness of burdening
citizens in a forum unrelated to the dispute with jury duty. See id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
187. See id at 254 n.22.
188. See id at 251 ("The doctrine of forum non conveniens ... is designed in part to
help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law.").
189. See id at 254-55.
190. See id at 254. The Court, however, suggested that "dismissal would not be ap-
propriate where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of
the dispute." Id. at 254 n.22.
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forum is "so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory" as to constitute "no
remedy at all," an unfavorable change in law is not a substantial concern
in a court's determination of the forum non conveniens motion. 19'
The Piper Aircraft guidelines provide an approach more consistent
with a court's proper role in resolving jurisdictional questions in cross-
border securities transactions. Further, forum non conveniens removes
from a court the responsibility of balancing different securities regulation
schemes and the policy judgments underlying them. While the doctrine
requires a court to weigh several factors, it avoids complex comparative
law analyses and furnishes an objective standard by which a court may
determine the propriety of exercising jurisdiction over a cross-border se-
curities transaction.' 92 It thus provides certainty and predictability, es-
tablishing a set of well-developed principles necessary to resolve difficult
questions in a principled manner. 9 a Moreover, the doctrine of forum
non conveniens confers on the court an important procedural power-the
power to subject dismissal to the condition that the defendant agree to
provide records relevant to the plaintiff's claim,' 94 to waive statute of
limitations defenses 95 or to consent to personal jurisdiction in the for-
eign forum.'
96
In sum, theforum non conveniens approach is preferable to an interest-
based approach. It provides a judicially manageable solution to resolv-
ing jurisdictional conflicts. If the balance of "conveniences" suggests
that a foreign forum may more appropriately adjudicate the securities
claim and a remedy is available in the jurisdiction, then a court should
dismiss the action subject to appropriate conditions.' 97 Moreover, in ap-
191. See id.; see also In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India,
634 F. Supp. 842, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (absence of class action procedure does not consti-
tute "no remedy" or lead to conclusion that inadequate alternative forum), modified on
other grounds, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
192. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251.
193. See Sandage, supra note 176, at 1710.
194. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257 n.25. The Second Circuit, however, has held
that a district court has no authority to compel the defendant to consent to the use of
American discovery rules in a foreign proceeding. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas
Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 195, 205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871
(1987).
195. See Union Carbide, 809 F.2d at 203-04 (noting that such conditions are "not unu-
sual and have been imposed in numerous cases where the foreign court would not provide
an adequate alternative in the absence of such a condition").
196. See id.
197. The United States' securities laws differ from foreign laws in terms of the substan-
tive rules, the availability of relief, and the types of damages available. See generally
Misao Tatsuta, Japan, in 11 International Capital Markets and Securities Regulations
(Harold S. Bloomenthal ed. 1990) (describing Japanese Securities Exchange Law of
1946); Astrid R. Baumgardner, SEC/COB Agreements: The French Perspective,
N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1990, at 5; Lightburn, supra note 2 (discussing French enforcement of
securities laws); Miller, supra note 2 (examining United Kingdom's Financial Services
Act's investor protection regulations); Rider, supra note 2 (discussing Britain's Financial
Services Act of 1986 and history of British regulation of securities fraud); Creaven, supra
note 2 (discussing securities industry reform in the United Kingdom); Nicole J. Ramsay,
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plying the doctrine, a court satisfies the fundamental objections of the
interest-based commentators and foreign governments-the United
States declines jurisdiction over cases involving fundamental policy judg-
ments of foreign governments about the proper manner of securities reg-
ulation in their domestic financial markets. Further, the court avoids
wasting precious judicial resources on a predominately foreign dispute'98
and vexatious litigation.
CONCLUSION
The application of the Exchange Act to transnational securities activi-
ties currently rests on judicial decisions rather than the express language
of the Exchange Act. 199 Since Schoenbaum, the circuit courts have
sought to define the degree of conduct within the United States, and the
level of economic effect on the United States' securities markets or inves-
tors, sufficient to trigger the application of the Exchange Act to cross-
border securities transactions. The Second Circuit's direct causation ju-
risprudence, however, fails to recognize the increasing importance of the
foreign investor to the stability of the United States' financial markets
and the overseas capital-raising activities of United States firms. The fail-
ure to permit a foreign plaintiff's private action where the defendant's
Note, Japanese Securities Regulation: Problems of Enforcement, 60 Fordham L. Rev.
S255 (1992), (discussing limited enforcement of Japan's securities laws); Goldman, supra
note 2 (discussing French securities market reforms).
Moreover, private lawsuits play an important part in enforcing the United States' se-
curities laws and liberal pre-trial discovery tends to make litigation in the United States
"more intrusive, more time-consuming, and more costly than litigation in other coun-
tries." Fisch, supra note 5, at 531. Indeed, the English jurist Lord Denning has
observed,
As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If
he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune. At no cost
to himself, and at no risk of having to pay anything to the other side. The
lawyers there will conduct the case "on spec" as we say, or on a "contingency
fee" as they say. The lawyers will charge the litigant nothing for their services
but instead they will take 40% of the damages, if they win the case in court, or
out of court on a settlement. If they lose, the litigant will have nothing to pay to
the other side. The courts in the United States have no such costs deterrent as
we have. There is also in the United States a right to trial by jury. These are
prone to award fabulous damages. They are notoriously sympathetic and know
that the lawyers will take their 40% before the plaintiff gets anything. All this
means that the defendant can be readily forced into a settlement. The plaintiff
holds all the cards.
Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74. As Lord
Denning's comments illustrate, differences in securities regulations among foreign states
often reflect different policy judgments, values, or economic objectives. See generally
Grossfeld & Rogers, supra note 5.
198. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975).
199. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1974) (noting
private actions under Rule lOb-5 are "a judicial oak which has grown from little more
than a legislative acorn").
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acts in the United States are "merely preparatory" impugns the per-
ceived fairness and integrity of the United States securities markets.
A "purposeful use" analysis offers a valuable supplement to the tradi-
tional conduct analysis. Under this approach, a federal court should as-
sert jurisdiction over a foreign plaintiff's fraud claim where the defendant
purposely has used its apparent affiliation with the United States to in-
duce a foreign plaintiff to enter into a fraudulent securities transaction.
Significantly, the "purposeful use" concept recognizes the increasing im-
portance of the foreign investor, but also provides a means by which to
restrict a foreign plaintiff's access to the United States' courts.
The increasing integration of the world's securities markets also
portends continuing sources of conflict between the United States and
foreign countries as the United States' securities laws are applied to an
increasing number of transnational activities. Unlike the interest-based
approaches to resolving these conflicts, the traditional judicial doctrine of
forum non conveniens better accommodates this process of integration.
Significantly, it offers a judicially manageable method permitting courts
to dismiss predominately foreign transactions where a foreign tribunal is
better positioned to adjudicate the challenged transaction.
The financial markets in the United State are closely linked to financial
markets in other nations. Today, the United States has a far larger share
of its financial assets owned by foreign investors than at the start of the
1980s. Indeed, the stability of the United States' financial markets and
the ability of American firms to participate effectively in overseas capital-
raising activities ultimately depends on the foreign investor's perception
of the integrity of the United States' financial markets. A limited exten-
sion of Rule lOb-5 will maintain that confidence for another fifty years.
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